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Guilty pleas in an inquisitorial setting – An empirical study of France 
LAURÈNE SOUBISE* 
Anglo-American guilty pleas have inspired criminal justice reformers in many 
inquisitorially-based systems in recent years, in response to caseload pressures. In 
France, two different procedures based on the defendant’s confession have been 
introduced in 1999 and 2004 respectively: an out-of-court disposal (the 
composition pénale) and a prosecution pathway (the comparution sur 
reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité). 
Basing its analysis upon direct observations and interviews with French public 
prosecutors, this paper examines the impact of these procedures on the French 
criminal justice system and its actors. Rather than a move from an inquisitorial to 
a more adversarial system, data collected for this study show a bureaucratisation 
of the French criminal justice process. The role of public prosecutors is changing 
from that of judicial officers to caseload managers who have delegated part of their 
workload to less qualified staff for efficiency purposes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The opportunity for defendants to admit their guilt before a judge and thereby avoid 
the need for a trial is a familiar feature in criminal justice systems founded on the 
adversarial tradition, such as England and Wales. By contrast, systems derived from the 
inquisitorial model, such as France, have not historically attached such weight to a 
defendant’s admission. Adversarial and inquisitorial models of criminal procedure1 
encompass two different procedural cultures: the inquisitorial culture conceives the 
criminal justice process as a neutral investigation conducted by impartial state officials 
in order to determine the truth, whereas the adversarial system characterises criminal 
procedure as the adjudication of a dispute between two parties (the prosecution and the 
defence) by a judge acting as a passive umpire. Guilty pleas fit more naturally within the 
adversarial model given the principle of party autonomy in defining the scope and terms 
of the dispute. The recognition by the defence that the prosecution is correct removes 
the need for each party to present evidence in support of or against a finding of guilt 
before the judge.2 Conversely, an admission of guilt by the defendant can be an 
important element in the decision of the judge in the inquisitorial model, but it might 
not provide a complete version of the truth, which is only to be determined by the judge. 
                                                 
1 These categories are not conceived as describing existing systems of criminal justice, but represent useful 
ideal-types which explain fundamental differences between common law and civil law criminal procedure 
traditions. 
2 However, the testing of the evidence at trial is at the very heart of the adversarial system. Yet, with guilty 
pleas, ‘there is no requirement on the prosecution to prove its case by the introduction of admissible and 
persuasive evidence; there are no restrictions on what might count as “evidence”; no witnesses are 
produced to give evidence (indeed, none may be available); there is no independent tribunal of fact; there 
is no settled procedure under which it should operate (or none that judges and practitioners seem able 
to follow); and there is no public trial or other independent decision- making tribunal.’ M. McConville 
and L. Marsh, Criminal Judges: Legitimacy, Courts and State-Induced Guilty Pleas in Britain (2014) 25. 
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Negotiations over pleas between defence and prosecution are even more alien to the 
inquisitorial ideal-type. Two forms of plea bargaining can be found in England and 
Wales: charge bargaining or fact bargaining. Charge bargaining typically consists of the 
defendant agreeing to plead guilty to a less serious offence than the prosecution 
originally proceeded upon. Alternatively, when the defendant faces several charges, an 
agreement to plead guilty to one or some of them can result in the discontinuance of 
others. Fact bargaining does not involve a change in the charge faced by the defendant, 
but an agreement between the prosecution and the defence on a factual basis acceptable 
by both sides. For instance, a defendant might agree to plead guilty to assault on the 
basis that she slapped the victim, but did not punch her as asserted in the original 
prosecution version of events. This can have an impact on the perceived seriousness of 
the offence and thus on sentencing. Whereas such negotiation is natural in the dispute 
model of an adversarial system where the parties can shape the remit of the passive 
decision-maker, it is unacceptable in principle in an inquisitorial system where the truth 
cannot be bargained with or compromised. Nevertheless, reforms in the last two 
decades have introduced new procedures based on an admission by the 
suspect/defendant in criminal justice systems rooted in the inquisitorial tradition. 
In France, the composition pénale was introduced in 1999, although the Act only came 
into force in 2001.3 Nicknamed ‘plea bargaining à la française’,4 it allows the public 
prosecutor to impose a sanction (such as a fine, but not imprisonment) on a person who 
admits the commission of an offence, which must then be validated by a judge. Contrary 
                                                 
3 Loi no 99-515 of 23 June 1999, renforçant l’efficacité de la procédure pénale, codified at articles 41-2 and 
41-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de procédure pénale – CPP). 
4 J. Pradel, ‘Une Consécration Du "Plea Bargaining" à La Française’ (1999) Recueil Dalloz 379. 
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to guilty pleas in England and Wales or the US, the composition pénale is defined as an 
alternative to prosecution according to article 40-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Code de procédure pénale – CPP) and does not result in a formal conviction. However, 
it will form part of the offender’s criminal record once accepted and complied with. A 
formal guilty plea procedure called the comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de 
culpabilité (CRPC – procedure on prior recognition of guilt) was introduced in 2004.5 
Following an admission by the defendant, the public prosecutor can offer a sentence of 
up to one year in prison which, if accepted, must again be validated by a judge. 
These new French procedures have been presented as a legal transplant from the Anglo-
American practice of plea bargaining,6 although several scholars have underlined 
important differences.7 Similar concerns have been discussed in both French and Anglo-
American procedures involving an admission by the defendant, in particular the central 
role given to public prosecutors in place of judges and the professed objective of 
efficiency leading to the bureaucratisation of the criminal justice process.8 In France, 
                                                 
5 Loi no 2004-204 of 9 March 2004, portant adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la criminalité, 
codified at articles 495-7 to 495-16 CPP. 
6 F. Desprez, ‘La Comparution Sur Reconnaissance Préalable de Culpabilité: 18 Mois d’application à 
Montpellier (1er Octobre 2004 – 1er Avril 2006)’ (2006) Archives de politique criminelle 109; J.-P. Céré and 
P. Remillieux, ‘De La Composition Pénale à La Comparution Sur Reconnaissance Préalable de Culpabilité: 
Le "plaider Coupable" à La Française’ (2003) AJ Pénal 45; F. Molins, ‘Plaidoyer Pour Le "plaider Coupable": 
Des Vertus d’une Peine Négociée’ (2003) AJ Pénal 61. 
When it presented the bill introducing the CRPC in French law, the government clearly stated that it was 
‘inspired by Anglo-Saxon guilty plea procedures’: Bill no. 784, portant adaptation de la justice aux 
évolutions de la criminalité, registered before the Assemblée Nationale on 9 April 2003 
<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/projets/pl0784.asp> accessed 15 July 2015. 
7 M. Langer, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure’ (2004) 45 Harvard International Law J. 1; Pradel, op. cit., 
n. 4. 
8 C. Viennot, Le Procès Pénal Accéléré: Étude Des Transformations Du Jugement Pénal (2012); J. Hodgson, 
‘Guilty Pleas and the Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice’ in The prosecutor in 
transnational perspective, eds E. Luna and M. Wade (2012); V. Perrocheau, ‘La Composition Pénale et La 
Comparution Sur Reconnaissance de Culpabilité: Quelles Limites à l’omnipotence Du Parquet?’ (2010) 1 
Droit et Société 55; C. Saas, ‘De La Composition Pénale Au Plaider-Coupable: Le Pouvoir de Sanction Du 
Procureur’ (2004) Revue de science criminelle 827; G. E. Lynch, ‘Our Administrative System of Criminal 
Justice’ (1998) 66 Fordham Law Rev. 2117. 
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several empirical studies offer an interesting insight into the implementation of the 
composition pénale in practice.9 However, these early studies do not allow enough 
perspective to observe the long-term transformations of the criminal justice system as 
it took some time for the composition pénale to be fully adopted by professionals.10 
There have been few empirical studies of the implementation of the CRPC procedure. 
It is not clear which methodology was followed by Desprez in his study of the 
implementation of the CRPC in three court centres.11 Viennot’s study of accelerated 
procedures in French criminal justice is based partly on empirical data collected during 
periods of direct observations and through interviews, although the number of 
interviews and the time spent observing the work of practitioners are not known.12 She 
found that accelerated procedures in French criminal justice were characterised both 
by a transformation of the figure of the judge – with a delegation of judicial functions 
to several legal actors, including public prosecutors – along with a transformation of the 
act of judging – with limited possibilities for debates on legal issues. In 2013, a wide-
ranging empirical study highlighted the pressures on resources that weigh on 
procureurs’ procedural choices.13 However, there have been few comparative studies of 
these procedures. Luna and Wade14 and their contributors have shown how 
prosecutorial powers have been increased in many criminal justice systems in order to 
                                                 
9 P. Milburn et al., ‘Controverses et Compromis Dans La Mise En Place de La Composition Pénale’ (2005) 
Archives de politique criminelle 151; J. Danet and S. Grunvald, ‘Brèves Remarques Tirées d’une Première 
Évaluation de La Composition Pénale’ (2004) AJ Pénal 196. 
10 1,511 compositions pénales in 2001, 6,755 in 2002 and 14,788 in 2003, but progressively increasing and 
remaining broadly stable at over 70,000 from 2009 according to official figures. 
11 F. Desprez, ‘L’application de La Comparution Sur Reconnaissance Préalable de Culpabilité à Nîmes et 
Béziers. Au Regard Du Principe de Judiciarité’ (2007) Archives de politique criminelle 145; Desprez, op. cit., 
n. 6. 
12 Viennot, op. cit., n. 8. 
13 J. Danet (ed), La réponse pénale dix ans de traitement des délits (2013). 
14 E. Luna and M. Wade (eds), The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective (2012). 
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process cases more efficiently, including through the implementation of admission-
based procedures.15 Indeed, the incursion of efficiency and managerialism in criminal 
justice appears to be one of the converging factors for European criminal justice 
systems.16 
This article aims to fill this gap by providing a comparative and empirical study of the 
impact of the procedures based on the admission of the offender in France on public 
prosecutions. The study draws on data collected during fieldwork conducted in 2013 in 
France and England and Wales. I observed the work of French public prosecutors 
(procureurs) in a medium-sized court centre (around 30,000 cases processed by 
procureurs each year) for a total of two months. I spent time with procureurs supervising 
police investigations over the phone and deciding whether to prosecute cases or not. I 
also observed how cases were disposed of, whether at trial or through alternatives to 
prosecution. In particular, I observed a total of 103 cases dealt with by four different 
prosecutors through CRPC and 18 cases of compositions pénales processed outside of 
court by two délégués du procureur. I also carried out interviews with eight of the nine 
procureurs working at the court centre (from the highest ranking official to the most 
junior level: Procureur de la République, procureurs adjoints, vice-procureurs and 
substituts),17 as well as one trainee procureur coming towards the end of her training 
period. Although primarily centred on French criminal procedure, the analysis also 
                                                 
15 See also J.-M. Jehle and M. Wade (eds), Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise of 
Prosecutorial Power Across Europe (2006). 
16 A. Binet-Grosclaude, L’avant-procès pénal: étude comparée Angleterre-France (2011); J. McEwan, ‘From 
Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in Transition’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 519. 
17 At the local level, each prosecution service office is headed by a Procureur de la République who manages 
a team of more junior procureurs who can have different ranks, depending on the size of the office: i.e. 
large court centres (such as Paris) can be staffed by many procureurs (over 100 in Paris) divided in teams 
headed by procureurs adjoints and/or vice-procureurs; the smallest court centres only consist of the 
Procureur de la République and one or two substituts. 
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makes comparisons with the practice of guilty pleas and plea bargaining in England and 
Wales, based on four months of observational fieldwork carried out at a Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) office in 2012 and 31 interviews with CPS staff. 
French public prosecutors are part of the same professional body as judges, and not 
public service lawyers as in England and Wales. At the heart of the criminal justice 
processYet, procureurs have become administrators of the criminal justice system, with 
efficiency becoming a central objective in their decisions. This new role is in tension 
with that of impartial adjudicator, which partly justified the transfer of judicial functions 
from judges to procureurs in admission-based procedures such as the composition 
pénale and the CRPC. In this paper I argue that, although procureurs still sometimes 
attempt to behave according to their professional ethos of magistrats by tailoring their 
decision to the specificities of cases and by checking the veracity of the defendant’s 
admission, the pressures of processing cases as quickly and efficiently as possible are 
often overwhelming. This has resulted in the bureaucratisation of prosecutorial 
decision-making through the use of standardised tables and the delegation of a large 
part of procureurs’ caseload to less qualified staff. A shift towards a more adversarial 
legal culture is prevented by the weakness of defence lawyers for historical and cultural 
reasons. Instead, the inquisitorial culture of procureurs is changing due to increasing 
managerial expectations, threatening to transform the criminal justice system into an 
administrative system of justice where both guilt and sentence are determined by public 
servants with no legal qualifications according to standardised tables or, potentially, by 
computer systems. 
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GUILTY PLEAS AND THE INQUISITORIAL ROOTS OF THE FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Inquisitorial roots explain the central role played today by public prosecutors in French 
criminal procedure. The juge d’instruction (investigative judge) is usually presented as 
the paradigmatic example of the neutral judicial officer collecting inculpatory as well as 
exculpatory evidence, yet she oversees a tiny proportion of cases in practice.18 Most cases 
are investigated by the police under the supervision of another judicial officer, the 
procureur. Along with trial judges and juges d’instruction, procureurs belong to the 
magistrature, the French career-trained judiciary. As such, they can and do switch 
between roles throughout their career. Unlike judges, however, procureurs are part of a 
hierarchical organisation with the Minister of Justice, a member of the government, at 
the top of the pyramid.19 
By contrast with public prosecutors in England and Wales, procureurs are not 
understood as representing the narrow interests of the prosecution side, but are 
supposed to represent the wider public interest as magistrats. Procureurs must ensure 
that all lines of enquiry are explored by the police, including those potentially 
exculpating the suspect, and should protect the rights of the accused. However, in 
practice, procureurs often favour a crime-control orientation to the public interest when 
                                                 
18 Calculated as a percentage of cases proceeded with by public prosecutors (i.e. this includes 
prosecutions, alternatives to prosecution and compositions pénales) 16,946 cases out of 1,367,166 were 
sent to the juge d’instruction (around 1.24%) in 2016. Ministère de la Justice, ‘Les Chiffres Clefs de la Justice 
2017’. The recent Loi no 2016-731 of 3 June 2016 will further impact the distribution of cases between 
procureur and juge d’instruction. 
19 This link between the public prosecution service and politicians has long been controversial: for a recent 
summary of the debate, see J. Hodgson and L. Soubise, ‘Prosecution in France’ (2016) Oxford Handbooks 
Online 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199935383-e-124>. 
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supervising police investigations.20 Trust is central in the relationship between 
procureurs and police investigators, with supervision usually being limited to a 
retrospective, bureaucratic review of the investigative file, rather than a close 
monitoring of police actions.21 
The judicial status of procureurs under French law has been called into question, 
following recent decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)22 which 
found that they do not meet the guarantees of independence required from a ‘judicial 
officer’ under article 5 para. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.23 The idea 
that procureurs and judges should not be part of the same body is today gaining 
momentum as a majority of defence lawyers, but also of judges, wish for a split of the 
magistrature.24 Procureurs are for the most part opposed to this, fearing an ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ drift, where prosecutors would be reduced to the role of public accusers. The 
procureurs I interviewed largely shared this vision, feeling that their status of magistrat 
was essential to defend their position. 
                                                 
20 J. Hodgson, French Criminal Justice: A Comparative Account of the Investigation and Prosecution of 
Crime in France (2005); J. Hodgson, ‘Hierarchy, Bureaucracy, and Ideology in French Criminal Justice: 
Some Empirical Observations’ (2002) 29 J. of Law and Society 227. 
21 Hodgson, op. cit. (2005), n. 20; C. Mouhanna, Polices judiciaires et magistrats: une affaire de confiance 
(2001). 
22 Medvedyev And Others v France (2010) 51 EHRR 39, para 124; Moulin v France App no 37104/06 (ECtHR, 
20 November 2010), para 59. 
23 A. Giudicelli, ‘Le Ministère Public n’est Pas Une Autorité Judiciaire Au Sens de La Convention de 
Sauvegarde Des Droits de l’homme: Quelles Conséquences Sur Le Contrôle de La Garde à Vue?’ (2011) 
Revue de science criminelle 142; J.-P. Jean, ‘Le Ministère Public Français Au Regard Des Justices Pénales 
d’Europe’ (2011) AJ Pénal 106; W. Mastor, ‘Le Ministère Public Est-Il Une Autorité Judiciaire?’ (2011) 
Nouveaux cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel 231; J. Pradel, ‘Quel(s) Magistrat(s) Pour Contrôler et 
Prolonger La Garde à Vue? Vers Une Convergence Entre La Cour de Strasbourg et La Chambre Criminelle 
de La Cour de Cassation’ (2011) Recueil Dalloz 338; D. Roets, ‘Le Manque d’indépendance Du Ministère 
Public Français à l’égard de l’exécutif et Des Parties: Un Obstacle à l’exercice de Certaines Fonctions’ (2011) 
Revue de science criminelle 208; J. Hodgson, ‘The French Prosecutor in Question’ (2010) 67 Washington 
and Lee Law Rev. 1361; F. Sudre, ‘Le Glas Du Parquet’ (2010) La Semaine Juridique 2277; J.-P. Marguénaud, 
‘Tempête Sur Le Parquet’ (2009) Revue de science criminelle 176; J.-F. Renucci, ‘Un Séisme Judiciaire: Pour 
La Cour Européenne Des Droits de l’homme, Les Magistrats Du Parquet Ne Sont Pas Une Autorité 
Judiciaire’ (2009) Recueil Dalloz 600. 
24 P. Milburn et al., Les Procureurs, Entre Vocation Judiciaire et Fonctions Politiques (2010). 
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Despite all this, the image of the procureur as protector of the public interest and 
magistrat still gives them great prestige in French legal culture. Recently, it has also 
justified the transfer of powers from the judge to the procureur to cope with the justice 
system’s overload. Procureurs not only decide whether to prosecute a case or not, but 
also which procedural pathway to send the case on. They can decide to engage 
alternatives to prosecution, such as warnings (rappels à la loi), mediation,25 voluntary 
reparation/compensation, rehabilitation schemes, but also compositions pénales. Even 
when procureurs do decide to prosecute the suspect, they can choose from several 
procedures: speedy ‘on-file’ procedure (ordonnance pénale),26 CRPC, speedy trial 
(comparution immédiate),27 trial before the tribunal correctionnel28 or formal 
investigation by a judge (instruction). 
The judicial status of procureurs as magistrats has also been put forward to justify their 
intrusion in the adjudication function in admission-based procedures: ‘Without any 
doubt, the procureur de la République has important powers at his disposal since he has 
got the initiative of this procedure and determines the sentence that he will propose. 
But let’s not forget that the procureur is a magistrat, a natural defender of liberties just 
                                                 
25 Loi no. 93-2 of 4 January 1993 introduces mediation as an alternative to prosecution. See J.-P. Allinne, 
Gouverner le crime: les politiques criminelles françaises de la révolution au XXIe siècle. Tome 2, Le temps 
des doutes, 1920-2004 (2004) 132–145. 
26 The ordonnance pénale is a procedure without a public hearing. Judges make their decision purely on 
the basis of the prosecution papers. Since there is no public debate on guilt, the defendant can oppose 
the decision within thirty days and demand a trial. However, such oppositions seem rare in practice: see 
F. Zocchetto, ‘Juger Vite, Juger Mieux  ? Les Procédures Rapides de Traitement Des Affaires Pénales, Etat 
Des Lieux’ (Sénat 2005) Rapport d’information 17. 
27 The expedited comparution immédiate procedure is available in offences with a maximum sentence of 
between two and ten years imprisonment, where the procureur considers the case ready for trial (Art. 395 
CPP). The procedure is designed to rapidly process cases, tried within hours of the police custody period. 
See L. Mucchielli and E. Raquet, ‘Les Comparutions Immédiates Au TGI de Nice, Ou La Prison Comme 
Unique Réponse à Une Délinquance de Misère’ (2014) Revue de science criminelle 207. 
28 The tribunal correctionnel is normally composed of three professional judges – although some offences 
can be tried by a single judge – and tries mid-ranking offences such as burglary, theft, assaults, etc. 
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like judges (…)’.29 In theory, their professional culture and ideology of acting in the 
public interest means that they do not believe it appropriate to leave all protection of 
the interests of the accused to defence lawyers. It should prevent procureurs from 
behaving in a purely adversarial manner. Yet procureurs often conflate the public 
interest and a crime control oriented agenda in their supervision of police 
investigations.30 Do procureurs behave differently in admission-based procedures where 
they are placed in a more judicial role? Of equal importance is the impact of these 
procedures on the behaviour of defence lawyers, given the adversarial origins of the 
procedures. According to my own observations, procureurs are torn between their 
judicial role and the pressures to administer criminal casework efficiently. Rather than 
a shift towards a more adversarial system, I observed a bureaucratisation of the French 
criminal justice system. 
THE PROCUREUR, FROM JUDICIAL OFFICER TO CASELOAD MANAGER 
In a pure adversarial model, the decision to plead guilty rests with the defence. The 
defendant can decide to abandon her right to trial by admitting that she has committed 
the offence she is accused of. In practice, however, defendants in common law systems 
are pressured into pleading guilty by public prosecutors or, more generally, by the 
criminal justice system as a whole31 or even by their own defence lawyers,32 for efficiency 
                                                 
29 J. Pradel, ‘Défense Du Plaidoyer de Culpabilité. À Propos Du Projet de Loi Sur Les Évolutions de La 
Criminalité’ (2004) La Semaine Juridique 169. 
30 Hodgson, French Criminal Justice (n 20); Mouhanna (n 21). 
31 For instance, defendants who plead guilty are rewarded by a sentencing discount in England and Wales. 
32 M. McConville et al., Standing Accused: The Organisation and Practices of Criminal Defence Lawyers in 
Britain (1994); D. Newman, Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (2013). 
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purposes.33 Unlike in adversarial systems, the decision to dispose of a case through a 
guilty plea procedure in France resides mainly in the hands of procureurs and there is 
no bargaining on charges, in keeping with the system’s inquisitorial roots. However, the 
introduction of multiple procedural pathways has led to the bureaucratisation of 
prosecutorial decisions, with expectations on procureurs to manage the courts’ caseload 
efficiently. 
1. The absence of plea bargaining 
In my own fieldwork, prosecutors usually asked the police whether the suspect had 
made a confession in interview and relied on their assessment of the admission when 
deciding to summon a defendant for a CRPC hearing or for a composition pénale. I did 
not observe procureurs check the circumstances in which suspects had made such 
admissions, whether they had admitted all elements of the offence nor whether a 
defence might have been suggested. Procureurs generally make their decision over the 
phone, with no access to transcripts of police interviews. They are therefore completely 
reliant on police officers to assess the reality and reliability of the admission at this 
stage.34 Yet, pressures on suspects to confess at the police station have been well 
documented.35 Although there is no suggestion that they have been amplified since the 
                                                 
33 J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty (1977); McConville et al., op. 
cit., n. 32; Lynch, op. cit., n. 8; A. Sanders et al, Criminal Justice (2010, 4th edn.); S. Bibas, The Machinery 
of Criminal Justice (2012); McConville and Marsh, op. cit., n. 2. 
34 These findings chime with those of earlier empirical research which showed the relationship of trust 
existing between procureurs and police investigators, which leads to an absence of close monitoring of 
police actions: B. Bastard and C. Mouhanna, Une justice dans l’urgence: le traitement en temps réel des 
affaires pénales (2007); Hodgson, op. cit. (2005), n. 20; Hodgson, op. cit. (2002), n. 20; Mouhanna, op. cit., 
n. 21. 
35 J. Hodgson, ‘The Police, the Prosecutor and the Juge D’Instruction: Judicial Supervision in France, 
Theory and Practice’ (2001) 41 British Journal of Criminology 342; Mouhanna, op. cit., n. 21; Hodgson, op. 
cit. (2005), n. 20. 
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introduction of admission-based procedures, the risk that confessions at the police 
station have been coerced still exists.36 
According to article 495-7 CPP, the defence can request the use of the CRPC, but the 
decision in all cases I observed was taken by the procureur following her discussion with 
the police. Procureurs sometimes decided to ignore an allegation and charge only the 
offence that the suspect admitted, in order to proceed to a CRPC, but this decision was 
made solely by the procureur, with no attempt at charge bargaining from the defence. 
For example, in case F-101,37 a suspect had been arrested following an altercation in a 
car park where she was alleged to have used pepper spray against the victim and to have 
damaged her car. As the suspect admitted the assault, but not the criminal damage, the 
procureur decided to summon her to a CRPC only for the assault and not to charge her 
with criminal damage. 
In England and Wales plea bargaining often took place at the initiative of the defence 
lawyer, whereas I never observed French defence lawyers negotiating the charges faced 
by their clients with the procureur in two months of fieldwork. Several factors can 
account for this: defence lawyers gained greater access to police investigations only 
recently and tend to consider the defence role as a more passive and restricted role than 
their Anglo-Welsh counterparts;38 moreover, lawyers advising suspects at the police 
                                                 
36 The opposite might actually be true since defence lawyers have been permitted to attend police 
interviews from 2011: see J. Blackstock et al., Inside Police Custody: An Empirical Account of Suspects’ 
Rights in Four Jurisdictions (2014). Prior to that, they were only able to offer a 30-minute consultation to 
suspects: see Hodgson, op. cit. (2005), n. 20; J. Hodgson, ‘Constructing the Pre-Trial Role of the Defence 
in French Criminal Procedure: An Adversarial Outsider in an Inquisitorial Process?’ (2002) 6 The 
International J. of Evidence & Proof 1. 
37 Interview participants and cases are coded by the letters EW (for England and Wales) or F (for France) 
and a number (i.e. EW-126). 
38 S. Field and A. West, ‘Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: French Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial 
Criminal Process’ (2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 261; Hodgson, op. cit. (2002), n. 36. 
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station are unlikely to continue representing them at court.39 This prevents them from 
playing a more proactive role prior to trial, such as making representations to the 
procureur in favour of a specific procedural path. Recent reforms40 extended the right 
to access to a defence lawyer and expressly opened the possibility to make 
representations about the chosen procedural path in cases where the suspect is handed 
over to the procureur after police custody.41 Arguably, these reforms could prompt 
lawyers to play a more pro-active role in influencing the procedural path chosen by the 
procureur.42 However, such handing-over to the procureur after police custody only 
takes place where the procureur is considering the opening of an instruction or a 
comparution immédiate. In the vast majority of cases, defendants are given summons to 
a later court date by the police, with no opportunity for defence lawyers to make 
representations to the procureur. 
There have been concerns about privatisation of the criminal justice system through 
admission-based procedures, given the greater role afforded to private parties in 
theory.43 However, my findings show that the decision to process a case through 
composition pénale or CRPC remains firmly in the hands of procureurs. As such, the new 
                                                 
39 C. Saas, ‘Droits de La Défense et Alternatives Aux Poursuites: Des (r)Apports Réciproques Au Soutien 
d’une Politique Criminelle Pragmatique’ (2015) 1 Archives de politique criminelle 69; Blackstock et al., op. 
cit., n. 36, pp. 332–335; Y. Msika, ‘Plaider Coupable et Rôle de l’avocat à Pontoise et Ailleurs’ (2005) AJ 
Pénal 445. It should be noted that police station advice is often undertaken by accredited advisors, rather 
than fully qualified lawyers in England and Wales. Therefore, it is likely that the person representing the 
defendant in court will not have assisted them at the police station. However, the case will handled with 
within the same firm and the lawyer at court should have access to all the information gathered at the 
police station, whereas in France the case might handled by a different firm altogether. 
40 Loi no. 2014-535 of 27 May 2014 portant transposition de la directive 2012/13/UE du Parlement européen 
et du Conseil, du 22 mai 2012, relative au droit à l'information dans le cadre des procédures pénales; Loi no. 
2016-731 of 3 June 2016 renforçant la lutte contre le crime organisé, le terrorisme et leur financement, et 
améliorant l'efficacité et les garanties de la procédure pénale. 
41 Art. 393 CPP. 
42 See Saas, op. cit., n. 39, p. 76. 
43 Desprez, op. cit., n. 6, p. 109; see, more generally, X. Pin, ‘La Privatisation Du Procès Pénal’ (2002) Revue 
de science criminelle 245. 
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procedures reflect the inquisitorial roots of the French criminal procedure where a 
judicial officer is entrusted with making impartial decisions, rather than giving a greater 
role to defence lawyers. Moreover, the procedure reflects the objective concept of truth 
in inquisitorially based systems and the collateral reluctance to bargain with it.44 
As procureurs alone decide to use admission-based procedures, I will examine the 
criteria guiding their decisions in the next sections. Admission-based procedures were 
introduced in the French criminal justice process in order to speed up the disposal of 
cases. Yet, the use of CRPC and the composition pénale remains relatively limited, by 
comparison with guilty pleas in England and Wales. Systemic pressures on public 
prosecutors are different in each jurisdiction and this leads to different perceptions of 
the adequacy of guilty plea disposals. However, the objective of efficiency is paramount 
in both jurisdictions. 
2. The search for efficiency 
In 2016, proceedings were brought against almost 1.46 million individuals in the 
criminal courts in England and Wales.45 Meanwhile, French criminal courts handed 
down 1.09 million decisions at first instance.46 Processing such a high number of cases 
through criminal courts requires time and resources. In England and Wales, guilty plea 
procedures are seen as necessary to manage heavy courts’ caseloads. Similarly, the CRPC 
                                                 
44 See Langer, op. cit., n. 7, pp. 10–11; A. Garapon, ‘French Legal Culture and the Shock of “Globalization”’ 
(1995) 4 Social & Legal Studies 493. 
45 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Justice System statistics quarterly: December 2016’ (Ministry of Justice 
2016) 14, available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-
quarterly-december-2016> accessed 16 January 2018. 
46 Ministère de la Justice, ‘Les Chiffres Clefs de la Justice 2017’ (Ministère de la Justice 2017) 15 
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_Chiffres%20Cl%E9s%202017.pdf> accessed 16 January 2018. 
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was presented as a solution to French courts’ overburdened caseload at the time of its 
introduction by Parliament.47 
In France, procureurs have been at the forefront of the drive for efficiency in the criminal 
justice system, especially from 2001 onwards. The 2001 Loi organique relative aux lois 
de finances (LOLF) reformed the architecture of the state budget, in order to improve 
efficacy (by obtaining results in accordance with set objectives) and efficiency (by 
obtaining the best results from available resources).48 It introduced a new target for 
procureurs – the ‘criminal response rate’ – which measures the number of ‘prosecutable 
cases’ against the number of cases prosecuted at court or closed through alternatives to 
prosecution. Resulting from concerns over numerous dismissals by public prosecutors 
in the 1990s,49 the statistic is published by the Ministry of Justice to promote the 
efficiency of the ministère public50 and has been increasing constantly since its creation 
in 1998.51 Alternatives to prosecution and accelerated procedures are used to provide a 
                                                 
47 Rapport No 856 of J.-L. Warsmann for the National Assembly (available at <http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/12/rapports/r0856-t1-3.asp#P873_226599> accessed 19 December 2017). 
48 C. Vigour and A. Hastings-Marchadier, ‘L’économie budgétaire de la justice pénale’ in La réponse 
pénale. Dix ans de traitement des délits, ed. J. Danet, (2013); C. Mouhanna and F. Vesentini, ‘Indicators or 
Incentives? Some Thoughts on the Use of the Penal Response Rate for Measuring the Activity of Public 
Prosecutors’ Offices in France (1999–2010)’ in Modernisation of the Criminal Justice Chain and the Judicial 
System. New Insights on Trust, Cooperation and Human Capital, eds. A. Hondeghem et al. (2016). 
49 At the time, procureurs discontinued around eighty per cent of cases sent to them for a decision see, 
for instance, B. Aubusson de Cavarlay et al., ‘L’abandon Des Poursuites Par Le Parquet’ (1990) III 
Questions pénales; L. Simmat-Durand, ‘Le Parquet et l’opportunité Des Poursuites’ (1994) VII Questions 
pénales. It should be noted, however, that over half of those dismissals were, in fact, unresolved, i.e. no 
suspect had been found. 
50 The French public prosecution service is called ‘ministère public’. The word ‘parquet’ is also used as a 
collective term for procureurs. 
51 In 2016, 86 per cent of prosecutable cases were given a ‘response’ Ministère de la Justice, ‘Les Chiffres-
Clés de La Justice 2017’ (Ministère de la Justice 2017) < 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_Chiffres%20Cl%E9s%202017.pdf> accessed 1 February 2018., 
compared with only 64.9 per cent in 1998 Ministère de la Justice, ‘Les Chiffres Clés de La Justice 1999’ 
(Ministère de la Justice 1999) <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/budget-et-statistiques-10054/chiffres-cles-de-
la-justice-10303/les-chiffres-clefs-1999-11865.html> accessed 10 May 2016. 
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systematic institutional response to offences, without increasing courts’ caseloads. The 
aim is to process the maximum number of cases with minimal resources.52 
3. The proportion of guilty pleas 
In England and Wales in 2016/17, over 78 per cent of defendants prosecuted by the CPS 
at the magistrates’ court and over 70 per cent at the Crown Court pleaded guilty.53 This 
means that the vast majority of criminal cases did not involve the presentation and 
cross-examination of evidence by each party. As explained by a CPS lawyer I 
interviewed, guilty pleas are ‘very much part of the DNA of the system’ (Interview 
respondent EW25). In France, growing pressures to improve efficiency significantly 
affect procureurs’ decision-making. Yet, far from becoming the preferred way to dispose 
of criminal cases in France, the CRPC represents 6.4 per cent of ‘prosecutable’ cases54 
and the composition pénale just over 5 per cent of cases in 2016.55 This difference can be 
explained by several factors, which include a stricter legal framework for guilty pleas in 
France than in England and Wales and the relative novelty of the French procedures 
compared to guilty pleas in England and Wales. Importantly, legal actors in each 
jurisdiction are also subject to different systemic pressures. 
                                                 
52 V. Gautron, ‘L’impact des préoccupations managériales sur l’administration locale de la justice pénale 
française’ (2014) Champ pénal <http://champpenal.revues.org/8715> accessed 29 July 2014. 
53 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2016-2017 (for the Period April 2016 - March 
2017)’ (2017) HC115 63–65 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/annual_report_2016_17.pdf> 
accessed 5 February 2018. 
54 In official figures published by the French Ministry of Justice, ‘prosecutable cases’ are cases where 
sufficient evidence exists against an identified suspect and there are no legal obstacles to prosecution. 
55 Ministère de la Justice, ‘Les Chiffres Clés de La Justice 2017’ (Ministère de la Justice 2017) 
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_Chiffres%20Cl%E9s%202017.pdf> accessed 1 August 2017. 
French researchers have underlined significant local variations in the use of these procedures, see, in 
particular, V. Gautron, ‘Different Methods, Same Results as French Criminal Courts Try to Meet 
Contradictory Policy Demands’ in Modernisation of the Criminal Justice Chain and the Judicial System. 
New Insights on Trust, Cooperation and Human Capital, eds. A. Hondeghem et al. (2016). 
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(a) Strict legal criteria 
Whilst guilty pleas are available for all criminal offences in England and Wales, the 
CRPC and the composition pénale are strictly framed by legislation. The composition 
pénale is applicable to minor and mid-ranking offences with a maximum penalty of five 
years imprisonment. The CRPC was originally limited to offences with a maximum 
penalty of five years or under, but was extended in 2011 to offences punished by up to 
ten years, except certain offences such as serious assaults. The resort to these measures 
is also influenced by the punishment likely to be imposed on the defendant. The 
composition pénale does not allow prosecutors to impose any imprisonment. The CRPC 
allows the public prosecutor to offer a sentence to a defendant who admits the offence, 
but the proposed sentence cannot be more than one year in prison or half the maximum 
penalty. Finally, the CRPC procedure can only apply to adults and not juveniles, who do 
not have capacity to contract in French law.56 Initially, the composition pénale was not 
available to juveniles either, but this was amended by a 2007 Act.57 
(b) Different systemic pressures on legal actors 
In England and Wales, prosecutors’ incentives to negotiate and obtain a guilty plea are 
particularly high. Trials are particularly resource-intensive: involving hours of 
preparation by investigators and lawyers on each side and the presence of several 
witnesses (as well as a lay jury at the Crown Court),58 they represent the opportunity for 
the parties to test their opposing accounts. Their outcomes are difficult to predict due 
                                                 
56 This reluctance to make guilty plea procedures available to minors suggests that the guilty plea is not 
understood simply as evidence of guilt in French admission-based procedures, but more fundamentally 
as a waiver of the right to trial, which implies the existence of a negotiated settlement between the 
prosecution and the defence and therefore full capacity to consent to the other party’s conditions. 
57 Loi 2007-297 of 5 March 2007 
58 Although a trial at the magistrates’ court is substantially cheaper than a trial by jury, it is still more 
expensive than a disposal by guilty plea. 
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to the high number of unknowns. CPS prosecutors I observed often commented that it 
was best to accept a plea to a lower charge, as it was ‘not worth going to trial’. 
Importantly, the pressures on the defence to plead guilty are significant, with a 
guaranteed sentence discount, the possibility of lowering the charge and the 
uncertainty of the trial outcome. 
In France, although both procedures were designed to accelerate the disposal of 
criminal cases, it still takes around five months on average to dispose of cases through 
the CRPC procedure and almost a year through composition pénale after the procureur’s 
choice of a specific pathway.59 One procureur (FR6) confided that she was not convinced 
by the efficiency gains: ‘There is the procureur in one room and the judge in another, 
working on the same files. If they were in the same room, it would be the same as a 
normal hearing.’ This comment reflects the abbreviated form of trials in the tribunal 
correctionnel where mid-ranking offences are judged. 
By contrast to England and Wales, there are fewer risks involved for public prosecutors 
to go to trial in France and trials take up far fewer resources. In England and Wales, the 
prosecution file is perceived as a partial account that must be confronted by the defence 
version for the truth to emerge; in France, the dossier is seen as the result of a more 
neutral investigation supervised by an impartial judicial officer. It is therefore much 
more difficult for the defence to contest the file’s content. Trials at the tribunal 
                                                 
59 V. Carrasco and L. Viard-Guillot, ‘Les Durées de Traitement Des Affaires Pénales Par La Justice’ (2015) 
Infostat 134 <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_Infostat%20134%20def.pdf> accessed 4 July 2015. 
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correctionnel are often short (from as little as fifteen minutes to a couple of hours, 
depending on complexity) as witnesses are rarely called to testify in court.60 
In England and Wales, efficiency concerns have led to growing numbers of guilty pleas 
and, in recent years, pressures on defendants to plead guilty as early as possible. In 
France, in reaction to the multiplication of simplified and accelerated procedures at 
their disposal, procureurs’ decision-making process has become increasingly 
standardised, by contrast with their discourse of individualisation of prosecutorial 
decisions to the particularities of the case and of the suspect. 
(c) Standardisation vs individualisation 
Procureurs have been given a wide range of options to process cases which could mean 
a response tailored to the offence seriousness and the suspect’s personality. Previous 
convictions, a stable life demonstrated through a permanent job and a family, a 
remorseful attitude, and so on, are all factors put forward as influential in their 
decisions. In my fieldwork, I observed procureurs using the procedural options at their 
disposal following a grading scale.61 The most minor offences were diverted to 
alternatives to prosecution, in a progressive range going from warnings, restorative 
measures and up to composition pénale. Cases commonly resolved through composition 
pénale included shoplifting, minor public order offences and cannabis possession. More 
serious offences were prosecuted through, in ascending order, ordonnance pénale, 
                                                 
60 See J. Hodgson, ‘Conceptions of the Trial in Inquisitorial and Adversarial Procedure’ in The trial on trial 
Vol.2 Judgment and calling to account, eds Antony Duff et al. (2006). Different traditions preside over the 
most serious cases tried at a cour d’assises, where witnesses are usually called to testify before a jury 
composed of magistrats and lay jurors. 
61 J. Pradel, ‘Vers Un “Aggiornamento” Des Réponses de La Procédure Pénale à La Criminalité; Apports de 
La Loi N° 2004-204 Du 9 Mars 2004 Dite Perben II. Première Partie’ (2004) La Semaine Juridique 821; 
Danet, op. cit., n. 13; A. Lenoir and V. Gautron, ‘Les Pratiques Des Parquets Face à l’injonction Politique 
de Réduire Le Taux de Classement sans Suite’ (2014) 3 Droit et Société 591. 
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CRPC, traditional correctionnel hearing and comparution immédiate. The CRPC 
procedure was typically used for drink driving or driving without a licence, but also 
domestic violence (minor assault and harassment), minor frauds and thefts. The 
defendants in CRPC usually had previous convictions. However, this ‘adaptation’ of the 
decision to the individual case comes up against the reality of limited resources and a 
heavy caseload. In practice, decisions are often made quickly, following standardised 
decision-making tables.62  
This standardisation of prosecutorial decision-making has been observed following the 
introduction of Traitement en Temps Réel (TTR) in the early 2000s. The TTR unit is 
staffed by procureurs who answer phone calls from police officers reporting orally on 
their investigations. Procureurs can ask questions and order further investigations. In 
straightforward cases, they indicate the charge to be brought and the court date, and 
the police issue the official summons to appear. The supervision of police investigations 
therefore often takes place over the phone and typically leads to a quick decision by the 
procureur, leaving little time for in-depth reflection.63 In cases of comparution 
immédiate, trial and sentence can take place within hours of the prosecutor’s decision. 
Bastard and Mouhanna show that the pressure to provide an immediate prosecutorial 
decision whilst on the phone with the police results in standardisation with the 
definition of grading scales within parquets to provide a quasi-automatic decision for 
mass offences.64 
                                                 
62 S. Grunvald, ‘Les choix et schémas d’orientation’ in La réponse pénale dix ans de traitement des délits, 
ed. J. Danet, (2013) 109–110; Lenoir and Gautron (n 67). 
63 Bastard and Mouhanna, op. cit., n. 34. 
64 ibid. 
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Going even further in the rationalisation of the process, permanent directives are an 
instrument of local prosecution policy shaping the parquet’s case treatment structure. 
Local parquets’ heads can issue directives to the police, so that police officers can 
determine certain case outcomes without contacting the parquet. In the area I observed, 
the Procureur de la République had issued directives for shoplifting, drink driving and 
cannabis possession. These directives standardise the response to mass offences based 
on comprehensive grading scales relating to, for example, blood alcohol level, drug 
quantity, or stolen goods’ value65 without any scope for greater individualisation.66 
These ‘permanent directives’ are used by parquets to control their workload by partially 
delegating out-of-court disposals to the police. Under this scheme in the area I 
observed, files were sent directly by the police to a Maison de la justice et du droit (MJD 
– House of Justice)67 without contacting the parquet. 
4. The judges’ input in earlier phases 
The quasi-sentencing power given to the procureur in the composition pénale and the 
CRPC procedures has been the subject of debates in France. In 1995, the Conseil 
constitutionnel struck out the injonction pénale, a predecessor of the composition 
pénale, considering that a criminal sanction could not be imposed by a public 
                                                 
65 For example, for a theft under €30 in value with a first-time offender who admits the offence and who 
lives within the area, a simple warning by the police officer is deemed sufficient. For a theft between €80-
120, the table distinguishes further: if the offender returned the stolen goods or eventually paid for them, 
the file goes for a composition pénale; if the offender did not return the goods or they were damaged and 
were not reimbursed, an ordonnance pénale is necessary, in a gradation of the seriousness of the response. 
66 See, for similar observations, G. Roussel et al., ‘La Coordination Entre Forces de Police et Justice Dans 
Le Traitement Des Délits’ in La réponse pénale. Dix ans de traitement des délits, ed. J. Danet (2013). 
67 Co-funded by local councils and the Ministry of Justice, Houses of Justice (MJD) were created to 
improve access to justice by offering legal services at the heart of the community. MJD organise the 
provision of pro-bono legal advice by lawyers, as well as mediation (civil and victim/offender) and other 
out-of-court disposals. See A. Crawford, ‘Justice De Proximité - The Growth of “Houses of Justice” and 
Victim/Offender Mediation in France: A Very Unfrench Legal Response?’ (2000) 9 Social & Legal Studies 
29. In many instances, procureurs recruited assistants, called délégués du procureur, to handle out-of-
court disposals at the MJD (see below). 
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prosecutor, but required the intervention of a judge, that is a member of the sitting 
judiciary independent from the executive.68 A composition pénale or a CRPC must 
therefore be validated by a judge, but this verification has been described as ‘quick’, 
‘succinct’ or even ‘artificial’, underlining that the judge can only accept or reject the 
sanction proposed by the prosecutor and that a deeper check would go against rapidity 
objectives for which the measures were first introduced.69 
Procureurs and judges work in court buildings and have many opportunities to speak to 
each other as colleagues, for example when meeting at the coffee machine. These 
conversations might include general matters of prosecution and sentencing policy. 
However, aAs judges’ agreement consent is required for smooth caseload management, 
public prosecutors have also negotiated formal agreements with judges in advance to 
avoid their decisions being rejected at the validation stage and thus ensure the 
procedures’ success. These agreements define the type of offences and the appropriate 
level of sanction for these procedures. Their level of detail varies, with some court 
centres adopting comprehensive decision-making tables.70 Judges have thus regained 
some of the powers they lost in the validation phase.71 However, the definition in 
advance of cases in which these procedures apply necessarily leads to further 
standardisation of prosecutorial decision-making. 
Although in principle procureurs should make their decision according to case specific 
characteristics and the offender, their decision-making is increasingly standardised and 
                                                 
68 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision No. 95-360 DC 2 February 1995, <http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1995/95360dc.htm> accessed 24 March 2014. 
69 Perrocheau, op. cit., n. 8; Saas, op. cit., n. 8. 
70 Grunvald, op. cit., n. 62; Danet and Grunvald, op. cit., n. 9; J.-D. Régnault, ‘Composition Pénale: 
L’exemple Du Tribunal de Cambrai’ (2003) AJ Pénal 55. 
71 Perrocheau, op. cit., n. 8. 
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automated, due to a drive for efficiency in criminal justice. Far from reinforcing their 
role as judicial officers, the multiplication of prosecution pathways has pushed 
procureurs to embrace a more administrative role, that of caseload managers. This move 
away from individualisation facilitates the delegation of some decisions from public 
prosecutors to police officers, instructed to follow set decision tables. The next section 
examines how cases are handled once the decision to use a ‘guilty plea’ procedure has 
been made. 
GUILTY PLEA PROCEDURES AND OCCUPATIONAL CULTURES 
Guilty plea procedures were criticised for going against fundamental principles of 
French criminal procedure. The move was perceived as participating in a wider 
privatisation movement of the criminal justice process72 in allowing the parties to shape 
the judicial debate. As we have seen, this concern has not come true in practice, with 
procureurs remaining firmly in charge of the decision to use an admission-based 
procedure and the absence of any charge bargaining in practice. It was also argued that 
it transformed the role of procureurs, although two opposing transformations were 
identified: the procureur came to replace the judge73 or there were risks that procureurs 
would behave more like a party to the proceedings, instead of a neutral judicial officer.74 
It is therefore interesting to see how procureurs behave in practice. 
                                                 
72 Pin, op. cit., n. 43; Desprez, op. cit., n. 6. 
73 Hodgson, op. cit., n. 8, p. 127; Saas, op. cit., n. 8. 
74 See Desprez, op. cit., n. 6, p. 113: ’The procureur represents society and must demand the application of 
the law, he should not negotiate. 
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1. The procureur’s ambivalent role in the CRPC 
The procureur must check the veracity of the admission when they meet the defendant 
before offering a sentence in the CRPC procedure. This verification by the procureur 
was not simply perfunctory in the cases I observed. Thus, in case F-26 where the 
defendant was charged with drink driving, the procureur (FR1) asked the defendant 
whether he admitted the offence, but the defendant declared that, although he had 
indeed been drinking, he was at home and not in his car when the police arrested him. 
Despite the willingness of the defence lawyer to negotiate on sentence, the procureur 
refused to carry on with the CRPC procedure and sent the case to trial: 
Procureur: So, you don’t admit drink driving then. 
Defence lawyer: well, it depends what sentence you’re offering. 
Procureur: No, no. The law says that the person has to admit the offence 
first, before a sentence is offered. If they don’t admit it, we don’t go any 
further. 
Making sure that the defendant admits the offence she is charged with is in line with 
the behaviour expected from judicial officers who must ensure that defence rights are 
respected, rather than leave it fully to the defence lawyer. The contrast could not be 
starker with England and Wales where I never observed CPS representatives expressing 
any doubt over the admission or carrying out such checks. There is simply no 
opportunity for public prosecutors to meet with represented defendants in the normal 
course of proceedings in this jurisdiction.75 In an adversarial system, it is the defence 
lawyer’s role to ensure that the defendant’s rights are respected which includes making 
sure that the admission is not made under pressure. This underlines the significance of 
                                                 
75 It should be noted that the Solicitors Code of Conduct (IB 11.4) prohibits solicitors (including those 
working for the CPS) to communicate with another party who has instructed a lawyer. A similar rule is 
in place for barristers. 
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McConville et al’s findings that defence lawyers in England and Wales, working on the 
assumption that their clients are probably guilty, actually often pressurised them to 
plead guilty.76 
The procureur’s decision to apply the CRPC procedure is not irrevocable and procureurs 
can decide to abandon it if they later realise that the abbreviated procedure is not 
appropriate to handle the case, as a full hearing is necessary. For instance, in case F-28, 
a defendant was charged with assault with a weapon against his employer. However, the 
procureur (FR1) noticed that the assault took place in the context of a highly difficult 
relationship between the defendant and the victim of the assault. The defendant 
reported to the procureur that he had been harassed and sexually assaulted by his 
employer, causing his reaction. The procureur told him that he did not think the case 
could be handled properly in a CRPC and advised the defence lawyer to request a 
psychological report for her client as the case was sent to trial.77 
In other respects however, procureurs are far less attentive to defendants’ rights, 
favouring quick case disposal instead. Thus, they issue two summonses to the accused 
for the same day: one for the CRPC and one for a trial. This means that if the CRPC is 
not successful, the case can still be disposed of swiftly. The practice was ruled as illegal 
by France’s highest courts,78 but was supported by Parliament through a change in the 
legislation in 2009.79 In my own fieldwork, CRPC cases were dealt with from 9am one 
                                                 
76 McConville et al., op. cit., n. 32, ch 6 and 10; see also Newman, op. cit., n. 32. 
77 At this stage, court proceedings were already formally open. As such, it was not within the procureur’s 
powers to order a psychological expertise himself. The court was sole permitted to order it. As the 
procureur might not have been the same person prosecuting at trial, this probably explains why the 
procureur advised the defence to request the expertise. 
78 CE, 11 May 2005 and CE, 26 April 2006; Cass. crim., 4 October 2006, no. 05-87.435, Bull. crim. 2006, no. 
244. 
79 Loi 2009-526 of 12 May 2009. 
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day of the week and unsuccessful CRPC cases were sent for trial at 11am on the same 
day.80 This organisation has important consequences on the behaviour of public 
prosecutors in practice. 
Whilst representation by a defence lawyer is mandatory for the CRPC, defendants can 
waive their right to a lawyer in the traditional trial. The cost of the lawyer is borne by 
defendants unless they qualify for legal aid. Defendants who cannot or do not want to 
pay for a lawyer are thus excluded from the CRPC. Procureurs did not perceive this to 
be an issue and simply sent unrepresented defendants to trial, as can be seen in the 
following examples. 
Two defendants were charged with handling stolen goods. They applied for legal 
aid, but did not qualify and they did not want to pay for a lawyer. 
Procureur (FR4): Not a problem, I’ll just ask you to sign to say that you don’t 
accept the CRPC. [case F-139] 
In another case, the defendant was charged with driving unlicensed and refused to 
have a lawyer. The procureur (FR4) did not try to explain why a lawyer might help, 
simply saying: ‘Okay, you’ll be tried at 11am’. [case F-140] 
I also observed, on several occasions, pressure being exerted by prosecutors to convince 
defendants to forgo the CRPC procedure and accept being tried without a lawyer. 
In case [F-282], the procureur (FR8) met three unrepresented defendants in 
separate cases. He asked: ‘Do you want to be tried at 11am without a lawyer?’ Two 
of the defendants said that they did not have enough resources for a lawyer. The 
procureur did not tell them that they could be eligible for legal aid. They agreed to 
be tried at 11am. One of them came back a few minutes later saying that he had 
spoken to the duty lawyer who had told him that he could have legal aid because 
he was on benefit. 
Defendant: I know your time is precious, so I don’t want to bother you. 
Procureur: No, no, you have a right to a lawyer, it’s not about what bothers me, so 
we can give you another date to come back for a CRPC. 
Defendant: Will it change anything to the sentence I get? 
                                                 
80 The case had to be adjourned to another date if the offence was only triable by three judges. 
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Procureur: No, it’s the same. 
This comment is in contradiction with the spirit of the procedure which should mean 
lower sentences in the CRPC than in the ordinary procedure in order to entice 
defendants to accept the procureur’s offer.81 Unsurprisingly, it was effective in 
persuading the defendant that he had nothing to lose by going to trial (even without a 
lawyer): 
Defendant: Ok, I’ll be tried at 11am today then. 
Procureur: Are you sure? 
Defendant: Yes, then it’s over. 
The last defendant seemed unsure what to do. The procureur left the room to see 
the other two defendants out. In his absence, the defendant asked the clerk if she 
thought he should take a lawyer. She replied that she could not advise him. 
Defendant (thinking out loud): If I’m tried today, then it’ll all be over with. 
The clerk confirmed this. I knew that, as an observer, I should not have intervened, 
but I could not help myself and I told him that it might be best for him to get a 
lawyer. He was told to come back at a later date. The procureur came back and the 
clerk explained that the defendant was hesitating. 
Procureur: He should just have accepted to be tried at 11am. 
Clerk: Well, I did my best. 
The procureur’s actions were evidently not in keeping with the image of a neutral 
magistrat, acting in the public interest and protecting defence rights, but were more 
consistent with an adversarial mindset. The prospect of disposing of these cases as 
quickly as possible, rather than having to process them at a later date, probably played 
a central role in her actions. 
                                                 
81 See below for an analysis of sentencing in the CRPC. 
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2. Negotiating the sentence: the weaknesses of defence lawyers exposed 
The legislation regulating the CRPC does not refer to negotiations and the ministerial 
circular accompanying the 2004 Act clearly excludes it.82 Although he insists that the 
law provides for a ‘plea without bargaining’, Pradel83 admits that this might be tempting 
for legal actors in practice. As explained above, there is no bargaining on charges taking 
place between the prosecution and the defence. Instead, some negotiations take place 
on sentence,84 in stark contrast with England and Wales where sentencing remains 
firmly in the hands of judges.85 Typically, the procureur first proposed a sentence before 
the defence lawyer mitigated for their client. A discussion on the sentence would then 
result, not simply between the procureur and the defence lawyer, but often with the 
active participation of the defendant as illustrated by the following case of drink driving: 
The procureur (FR1) offered a suspended prison sentence of one month, a 
€100 fine and the suspension of the driving licence for 12 months. The 
defence lawyer asked to reduce the length of the licence suspension. The 
procureur announced that it would mean increasing the fine in exchange. He 
proposed a 9-month suspension and a €1,000 fine. The defendant said that 
he was happy to pay more in order to reduce the suspension, because he had 
never taken his children on holiday and had planned to take them this 
summer. The procureur made the following final offer: 2-month suspended 
prison sentence, €1,500 fine and a suspension of the driving licence for six 
months. It was accepted by the defendant. [case F-35] 
The transparency of the French procedure contrasts widely with my observations in 
England and Wales. In England and Wales, discussions usually took place between the 
CPS representative and the defence lawyer in the courtroom, shortly before the case was 
heard, but in the absence of the defendant. French defendants have full knowledge of 
                                                 
82 Circular of 2 September 2004, Présentation des dispositions de la loi n° 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant 
adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la criminalité relatives à la procédure de comparution sur 
reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité (NOR: JUSD0430176C). 
83 Pradel, op. cit., n. 61. 
84 See, for instance, Msika, op. cit., n. 39. 
85 However, a sentencing discount applies to guilty pleas, depending on the timeliness of such plea. 
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the discussions that take place between the prosecutor and their lawyer. This contrasts 
with England and Wales where defence lawyers sometimes cooperate with public 
prosecutors to ensure that defendants plead guilty.86 Such cooperation appears 
impossible in the French system. 
The presence of the defendant in the discussion between the prosecution and the 
defence, however, underlines the weakness of defence lawyers in French criminal 
procedure. Whilst in England and Wales public prosecutors must go through the 
defence lawyer for plea bargaining, French procureurs can speak directly to the 
defendant, bypassing defence lawyers, relegated to the role of advisers, rather than 
representatives. This is in line with the diminished role expected from defence lawyers 
in the French system, in comparison with their counterparts in adversarial systems. 
During the pre-trial phase, French defence lawyers are thus merely perceived as 
‘auxiliaries’ to the magistrat, rather than primary actors, with defence lawyers who 
attempt to intervene during their client’s interrogations being usually given short shrift, 
both at the police station87 and before the juge d’instruction.88 There is a real risk of 
defence lawyers being used to legitimise the procedure without them having real powers 
to affect the outcome. 
The fairness of such ‘negotiations’ can be questioned given the inherent imbalance 
between the parties. In England and Wales, the Code for Crown Prosecutors regulates 
the behaviour of Crown Prosecutors in charging and subsequent plea bargaining. In 
particular, it clearly prohibits public prosecutors from overcharging in order to 
                                                 
86 McConville et al., op. cit., n. 32, p. 194 refer to the ‘sweetener’ agreed by defence lawyers with 
prosecutors to ensure their client pleaded guilty; see also Newman, op. cit., n. 32, pp. 116–117. 
87 Blackstock et al., op. cit., n. 36, pp. 398–408. 
88 Field and West, op. cit., n. 38; Hodgson, op. cit. (2005), n. 20, pp. 124–128. 
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encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious charge (para. 6.3). By comparison, 
in France, the circular presenting the new procedure expressly rejects the idea of any 
negotiation taking place between the procureur and the defence which means that the 
practice remains wholly unregulated. In my own fieldwork, I witnessed procureurs 
offering higher sentences than they believed to be fair as a starting point to the 
discussion with the defence. Thus, one procureur (FR1) told me that he purposefully 
asked for a high sentence in case F-32 to be able to negotiate it down, as he knew the 
defence lawyer was good. Another procureur (FR8) systematically factored negotiating 
room in his first offer to the defence, as became apparent in the following case of driving 
under the influence of cannabis: 
The procureur started by offering the defendant a hundred fine days at €6: 
this meant that he had to pay €600 or spend a hundred days in prison. 
Defence lawyer: Okay, no problem! 
Procureur (puzzled): Err… well, I’m offering 100 fine days at €5 actually. 
[The procureur then realises that he forgot to add an 8-month suspension of 
the defendant’s driving licence.] 
Defence lawyer: I did think that you were being lenient! 
[After some negotiating, a 7-month suspension is agreed. The defendant 
leaves the room.] 
Procureur [to the defence lawyer]: Don’t tell me you agree [with my offer], 
there’s an automatic 25 per cent reduction [on the sentence originally 
offered]! [case F-274] 
Although the above interaction only took place because of the procureur’s mistake, it 
reveals his habitual practice of offering a high sentence at the start of the negotiation. 
It should be noted, however, that the procureur did not settle for the most severe 
sentence, despite the ready acceptance by the defence lawyer, but instead 
spontaneously offered to lower the sentence, a behaviour more in line with his 
professional status of impartial judicial officer. 
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In theory, the CRPC procedure should lead to a lower sentence for the defendant than 
a traditional trial. However, the comparison of sentencing outcomes for the two 
procedures is fraught with difficulties as there is no guarantee that cases closed through 
CRPC or traditional trial are comparable. Looking at cases originally meant to be dealt 
with in CRPC, but eventually sent for a traditional trial, Ministry of Justice statisticians 
found that a quarter of defendants were sentenced to non-suspended imprisonment 
terms.89 This proportion is only 8 per cent for CRPC, suggesting greater severity for 
defendants opting for traditional trial. It is difficult to analyse whether this greater 
severity represents a form of ‘trial penalty’, where defendants would be punished for 
their voluntary decision to contest the charges against them or simply the result of their 
inability to secure the services of a defence lawyer and therefore of having mitigating 
factors presented on their behalf. 
A crucial part of the role of the defence lawyer is to advise her client whether to accept 
the sentence proposed by the public prosecutor.90 In the absence of any formal 
sentencing guidelines, defence lawyers must rely on their own experience and 
knowledge of the local sentencing culture to determine whether the offered sentence is 
advantageous to their client. As explained, there often are agreements in place between 
procureurs and judges on sentencing in the CRPC procedure. Moreover, as the case will 
be tried on the same day if the defendant refuses the sentence offered by the procureur 
and opts for a traditional trial, the same judge will either validate the sentence (in the 
                                                 
89 R. Houllé and G. Vaney, ‘La comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité, une procédure 
pénale de plus en plus utilisée’ (2017) Infostat 157 
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_Infostat_157.pdf> accessed 12 January 2018. 
90 Saas, op. cit., n. 39, p. 77 argues that the introduction of those new speedy procedures could transform 
the role of defence lawyers. 
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CRPC procedure) or impose a sentence following sentencing recommendations by the 
same procureur (in the traditional trial). It would therefore be a risky (or simply 
pointless) strategy for a defence lawyer to advise her client to refuse the sentence offered 
by the procureur. 
The empirical data I collected shows that the pressures to administer criminal casework 
efficiently can prevent procureurs from performing the judicial role expected from them 
in the CRPC procedure. Moreover, the historical and cultural weaknesses of defence 
lawyers do not permit them to provide a meaningful adversarial counterweight to the 
might of procureurs. Remarkably, procureurs play a much diminished role in 
composition pénale in practice, as they have delegated their role to less qualified staff. 
The judicial status of the procureur is therefore not perceived as necessary to deal with 
compositions pénales, where a procureur’s representative is seen as sufficient. 
3. The absence of procureurs or defence lawyers in the composition pénale 
Procureurs started recruiting délégués in the 1990s when alternatives to prosecution 
started developing. Délégués du procureur handle minor offences (public order offences, 
shoplifting, traffic offences, minor drug use, and so on). They administer some 
warnings, as well as compositions and ordonnances pénales. They can deal with a high 
proportion of procureurs’ caseloads: in 2016, alternatives to prosecution together with 
ordonnances pénales represented over 54 per cent of decisions taken by parquets.91 
No minimum qualification is required to become délégué du procureur. The website for 
the Ministry of Justice lists incredibly varied occupations as potentially leading to the 
function of délégué du procureur, such as retired police officers or magistrats, but also 
                                                 
91 Ministère de la Justice, ‘Les Chiffres Clés de La Justice 2017’, op. cit., n. 59. 
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social workers, nurses, students, engineers or farmers.92 Aubert observed that délégués 
were generally public service retirees (often former police officers/gendarmes or 
magistrats), recruited through recommendations, rather than through a formal 
recruitment process.93 The two délégués I observed during my own fieldwork were 
retired gendarmes who had volunteered to become délégués ‘to keep in contact with 
people’ and top up their pension. They were offered no training before starting in their 
new role and only attended a 3-day training session a few years after they started at the 
regional court of appeal with two days dedicated to practical simulations and one day 
to theory. 
In the area I observed, délégués had limited discretion as they had to follow standard 
grading scales defined by the parquet to decide which punishment should be 
administered (fine, community work, and so on) for cases automatically sent by the 
police under permanent directives. The parquet defined strict formulae to calculate 
fines, based on the defendant’s income bracket and, for instance, the quantity of 
cannabis found. Délégués also received cases from the police endorsed with specific 
instructions from procureurs with regards to the type of measure and the level of 
sentence to be administered, such as a fine between €200 and €400 for example. Such 
standardised sentencing does not at first sight require any legal skill and could be 
printed out from a computer. However, given that cases are usually sent directly from 
the police station to the délégués without proper oversight by a procureur (see below), 
                                                 
92 See <http://www.metiers.justice.gouv.fr/la-justice-hors-de-la-fonction-publique-12684/delegue-du-
procureur-de-la-republique-26860.html> accessed 5 February 2018. 
93 L. Aubert, ‘Systématisme Pénal et Alternatives Aux Poursuites En France  : Une Politique Pénale En 
Trompe-l’œil’ (2010) 1 Droit et Société 17; L. Aubert, ‘Appréhension Systématique Des Phénomènes de 
Délinquance et Troisième Voie: Les Dilemmes d’un Parquet Divisé’ (2009) VI Champ pénal 
<http://champpenal.revues.org/7613> accessed 17 April 2012. 
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délégués du procureur have an important role in ensuring that the legal requirements of 
the procedure are met, in particular when an admission is required. Importantly, they 
are also supposed to explain the procedure and the sentence to defendants. My 
observations show that this did not happen in practice. 
Each meeting between délégués and defendants lasted between 10 and 15 minutes. The 
délégués therefore did not have time to discuss the case in much detail and were not 
interested in hearing the defendant’s account.94 Although compositions pénales require 
the admission of the offence by the suspect, délégués rarely checked the reality of the 
admission and even ignored suggestions that the defendant might deny the offence or 
part of it. For example, in case F-187, the defendant was alleged to have insulted a bus 
driver. The délégué started the meeting by summarising the case: 
Délégué: On [date], you had an argument with a bus driver and you gave her the 
finger when you left the bus. 
Defendant: Yes, that’s true. 
Délégué: Then on [later date], you were on the bus with the same driver and you 
had a difficult conversation with her. 
Defendant: No, that’s not true. 
[In interview at the police station, the defendant admitted the first incident, but not 
the second one.] 
Délégué: I’m not here to speak about the facts; you admitted [the offence]. I’m just 
here to offer you a composition pénale. You can accept my offer or refuse it. If you 
refuse, you’ll be tried at court. (…) 
[The defendant accepted the composition pénale.] 
Case F-200 concerned a defendant accused of stealing a computer mouse from a shop. 
He struggled to express himself in French and the conversation was therefore quite 
difficult. 
                                                 
94 For similar findings, see Milburn et al., op. cit., n. 9. 
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Délégué: Okay, do you accept the composition pénale then? 
Defendant: Well, I don’t have a choice; I want to sort it out. 
Délégué: Yes, you do have a choice! If you think you’re not in the wrong, you 
shouldn’t accept. You did steal this mouse, didn’t you? 
Defendant [it is difficult to understand him]: No, I didn’t steal it, a young guy took 
it. He’s a youth; I’m an adult, so I take responsibility. 
Délégué: Well, in this case, it would be handling stolen goods (…) 
[Speaking to the researcher] He’s telling me that he’s taken the mouse out of the 
shop to help another guy, but that’s handling. I think it’s punished more severely 
than theft, so there’s no point for him to go to court! 
[The délégué checks the criminal code and finds that handling stolen goods is 
indeed punished more severely than theft] 
[To the defendant] If you go to court to contest the theft, they’ll convict you for 
handling and it’s punished more severely. So, do you accept? 
Defendant: I don’t have a choice anyway. 
Délégué: Okay, so you accept. 
Although the délégués always presented the offer as a lenient gesture from the procureur 
and emphasised that the choice rested with the defendant, they clearly had no interest 
in the case going to court. In fact, they exercised pressure to obtain the cooperation of 
the defendant, often presenting the maximum punishment as the sentence defendants 
exposed themselves to if they chose to go to court.95 This is in stark contrast with the 
behaviour of procureurs during CRPC hearings. Whilst the procureurs’ ideology appears 
to incite them to check the veracity of the defendant’s admission and to refer the case 
to a full trial if it seems in the interest of the defendant, the délégués du procureur I 
observed did not share the same professional ethos. As former police officers or 
gendarmes, they unconsciously reverted back to old habits of police station 
interrogations when talking to suspects. 
                                                 
95 Aubert also notes that délégués used the defendants’ lack of knowledge of their status and powers to 
their advantage: L. Aubert, ‘L’activité des délégués du procureur en France: de l’intention à la réalité des 
pratiques’ (2008) 32 Déviance et Société 473, 479. 
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[The defendant was arrested and found to be in possession of 0.15g of cannabis] 
Délégué: For this, the procureur could have sent you to court. 
Defendant: It was the first time I was caught. 
Délégué: Even for a first time, you could have been sent to court. 
Defendant: I don’t know anything about courts or police. 
Délégué: Well, I will tell you [he opens the criminal code and reads the relevant 
article out loud]. In front of the court, you could have had up to one year in prison 
and a €3,750 fine. However, the procureur decided to offer you an alternative to 
prosecution. If you accept it, you will need to pay a €120 fine. You can refuse it, 
but then you will be sent to court. 
Defendant: No, no, I accept. [case F-196] 
Despite the délégués’ lack of judicial status and the summary nature of the procedure 
before them, limited safeguards are in place to protect defendants’ rights. Defendants 
can choose to be represented by a lawyer, but I never witnessed such a case over my 
two-day long observations, although one délégué told me that it happened more 
frequently. He claimed that they did not need a lawyer given the pettiness of the offence 
and the lightness of the sanction. However, although compositions pénales are not 
formally equivalent to convictions, they are nonetheless recorded on a defendant’s 
criminal record and will be taken into account in the event of future offending. 
Furthermore, the interactions between délégués and defendants and the pressures put 
on the latter to accept the sentence are reminiscent of police station encounters where 
the presence of the defence lawyer is necessary to conform with the right to a fair trial 
defined at article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. An important factor 
explaining the absence of defence lawyers for compositions pénales is the low legal aid 
fee, a mere €46. Bureau96 also notes that the limited discretion afforded to délégués 
renders any sentence mitigation by a lawyer meaningless. 
                                                 
96 A. Bureau, ‘Etat Des Lieux d’un Dispositif Procédural Atypique: La Composition Pénale’ (2005) I 
Archives de politique criminelle 125. 
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Délégués du procureur in the area I observed operated outside of court, in a Maison de 
la Justice et du Droit (MJD).97 Cases were therefore not processed in open court which 
means that they were not open to public scrutiny. Furthermore, they were subjected to 
very few checks by procureurs and judges. Cases that fell under permanent directives 
were sent directly from the police to the MJD without being checked by the parquet first 
or even without the parquet being aware of their existence. A procureur could decide to 
use composition pénale even if the offence fell outside of permanent directives, but they 
relied on the police oral report to make their decision and the file was again sent directly 
from the police to the MJD. Following the first meeting with the defendant, délégués 
sent the files to the parquet along with the offer they made to the defendant. A procureur 
should review them and send them to the judge for validation. However, with over 
2,000 ordonnance or composition pénale every year in the court centre I observed, the 
review by the procureur cannot amount to more than a cursory check. 
The requirement for a judge to validate the composition pénale was introduced 
following a ruling of unconstitutionality by the Conseil constitutionnel who considered 
that some of the measures that could be offered by the prosecutor were restrictive of 
individual freedom. As such, they could not be pronounced solely by the authority in 
charge of prosecution, even with the agreement of the defendant. They require the 
decision of a judge.98 In practice, however, this control of the judge amounts to little 
more than rubber-stamping.99 Importantly, whilst in the CRPC the judge will meet the 
                                                 
97 As they are funded at the local level, MJD are not present across the whole territory. Bureau notes that 
in some regions délégués operate within courts: A. Bureau, op. cit., n. 97, p. 133. 
98 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision 95-360 DC, 2 February 1995, para. 6. 
99 B. Pereira, ‘Justice Négociée: Efficacité Répressive et Droits de La Défense?’ (2005) Recueil Dalloz 2041; 
Saas, op. cit., n. 8. 
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defendant to double check the reality of the admission and to validate the agreed 
sentence, in the composition pénale the judge will make her decision purely on the file 
prepared by the police and on the decision added by the délégué du procureur, without 
a hearing. 
The clerk administering the MJD in my own fieldwork estimated that judges refused to 
validate the decision of the parquet in about 5 per cent of cases. She added: ‘they always 
explain why they refuse and I speak to the parquet about it who will speak to them as 
well. At the moment, we might have a few more refusals than normal because the judge 
is new, so it always takes a bit of time to get used to the way they work.’ This hinted to 
a form of agreement between the procureur and the judge to secure the cooperation of 
the latter ahead of these alternative or accelerated procedures being carried out.100 
CONCLUSION 
Procureurs can rightly be described as the most powerful officials in the French criminal 
justice system as their powers have steadily increased. In particular, they have been 
given substantial prerogatives in admission-based procedures, deciding which cases can 
be processed through a composition pénale or a CRPC and what sanction should be 
imposed against the offender. This paper interrogates the impact on public prosecutors 
and their decision-making process of the introduction of these theoretically adversarial 
transplants in French criminal procedure, using the Anglo-Welsh criminal justice 
system as a point of comparison. It is based on data collected through the direct 
observation of the work of public prosecutors for several months, complemented by 
                                                 
100 See above discussion and Danet, op. cit., n. 13; Saas, op. cit., n. 8. 
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interviews. A larger scale empirical research project would be necessary to determine 
whether or not data collected in this study are representative of the reality in all French 
parquets, rather than specific to the local site observed. However, the chosen 
methodology enabled me to observe the internal working of a parquet and to show 
which constraints apply to prosecutorial decisions in practice. Whilst studies have 
underlined important local variations in the use of these procedures, qualitative data 
they collected are confirmed by my own findings. 
Rather than a move from an inquisitorial to a more adversarial system, the data 
collected for this study show a bureaucratisation of the French criminal justice process. 
Similarly to England and Wales, judges play an increasingly reduced role in the disposal 
of criminal cases. They have been replaced by public prosecutors who, in theory, also 
have a judicial status and professional ethos in France. In practice, however, pressures 
to process more cases, quicker, and with fewer resources, have further eroded the 
judicial outlook of procureurs. The transfer of adjudicative powers from judges to public 
prosecutors has taken place in response to growing pressures on the criminal justice 
system to process cases efficiently. Although the judicial professional culture of 
procureurs prevents them from behaving in a purely adversarial manner –they do not 
pursue convictions at all cost nor the most severe sanction –, the competing expectation 
that the French public prosecution service should manage the courts’ caseload 
efficiently appears to have had profound effects on the occupational culture of 
procureurs. 
The political decision that public prosecutors ensure a systematic response to all 
criminal offences has put excessive demands on the criminal justice system and the 
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introduction of procedures borrowed from other jurisdictions, such as admission-based 
procedures, have failed to stem the flow of cases. Instead, prosecutorial decisions are 
increasingly made according to standardised decision-making tables, part of the 
prosecution workload is delegated to less qualified staff and minor cases are being 
processed as quickly as possible into a one-size-fits-all system. This evolution is taking 
place in the absence of meaningful defence safeguards with defence lawyers being 
unable to offer a credible counterweight to procureurs for historical and cultural 
reasons. Moreover, the delegation to less qualified staff of the composition pénale means 
the complete absence of the guarantees theoretically offered by the judicial status of the 
procureur in any event. 
